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NOTE.j

serted his claim. The general creditor in this case, the bank, had not
bargained for security. The bank had relied upon the statements of the
borrower that the equipment was unencumbered. It did not examine the
record. Had it done that, and had it found that there was nothing there,
then, obviously, it should have been protected against the other creditor
claiming the security interest in the chattels. No instrument was in fact
recorded because no mortgage had been executed. The secured creditor
had no more than an enforceable contract on the part of the debtor to
give him security, an equitable mortgage. There was nothing in the case
to suggest that there had been any plan as between the contractor and
the surety company to give security but to keep the security instrument
off the record. It is suggested here that both the bank and the surety
company could have insisted upon some form of security instrument,
chattel mortgages for instance, to secure their respective claims. It is
true that their claims were unliquidated or were to depend upon future
happenings, but that would not have made the giving of chattel mortgages to secure those claims impossible nor impractical. Neither creditor
did so insist. The surety company got in first to get the equipment. The
bank had not been misled by anything the surety company had failed
to do when the former made its loan without insisting upon some
form of security. The decision seems to approach the suggestion
that any general creditor is to be protected where the mortgage has not
been filed even after the mortgagee has stepped in and has seized the
goods. It is doubtful whether the filing statute, ambiguous as it is, gives
the court any excuse for such a sweeping decision. The decisions cited
by the court during the course of its opinion do not sustain the broad
proposition.
The legislature in adopting the Uniform Conditional Sales Act has
specified particularly that the security interest of the vendor shall not
be protected against any subsequent lien creditor without notice, good
faith purchaser or encumbrancer through the vendee, where the vendor
has failed to file within the time prescribed. 10 The statute in that form
is not ambiguous. Although the legislature has spoken that definitely the court still has power to work out an adjustment in favor
of the general creditor where circumstances suggest that the secured
creditor ought to be estopped to assert his security interest against him.
The chattel mortgage statute might well be redrawn. There is no reason why it ought not in this respect read like the statute covering the
filing of conditional sales agreements.
VERNON X. MLLER.

CONTRACTS-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS-RIGHTS OF
UNIONS AND INDIviDUALS.---"A trade agreement, or a collective labor

agreement, is a term used to describe a bargaining agreement entered
into by a group of employees, usually organized into a brotherhood or
union, on the one side, and a group of employers, or a corporation,
such as a railroad company, on the other side. Such an agreement may
be a brief statement of hours of labor and wages, or, on the other
10 Section 122.05, Wis. Stats., 1933.
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hand, it may take the form of a book ...or of an exhaustive pamphlet
regulating, in the greatest minuteness, even conditions under which
labor is to be performed, and touching upon such subjects as strikes,
lockouts, walkouts, seniority, apprentices, shop conditions, safety devices, and group insurance."', Originally there was much doubt concerning the enforceability of these collective bargaining agreements.
Much of the doubt arose out of the rather unusual character of the
agreements. They are made between the union and the employer but
are of no practical value to either party unless individual laborers
agree to work for the employer. Neither of the contracting parties can
force individuals to make these individual agreements, or abide by
them once they are made. On the other hand, the individual laborer (or
the union) can not force the employer to hire anyone at all if he decides to close down his business, 2 nor can it force him to keep unsatisfactory workers in his employment.3 But if individual agreements are
made and work is given, the collective bargain has a legal effect upon
the individual bargain and controls wages, hours of work, conditions
and so on. Thus, it is a hybrid device which the courts did not, at first,
like to enforce.
Until after the war labor unions or their individual members made
few attempts to enforce their collective bargaining agreements in the
courts. 4 The labor leaders mistrusted the courts and preferred to en-

force their agreements by means of the strike. There was much to
justify their suspicions. The courts had shown a tendency to listen
to any of the numerous objections which were raised against the enforcement of such agreements. It was said that they were not contracts at all because the union, an unincorporated association, did not
have the power to contract or to enforce a contract in the court; that
they were founded upon no consideration because all of the promises
were made by the employer and none by the union; that they lacked
mutuality because they could not be specifically enforced against the
union (being viewed as contracts for personal services). Collective
agreements have gained legal status by the slow process of overcoming
these objections.
POWER OF A UNION TO CONTRACT AND TO SUE

Chief Justice Taft, in the famous Coronado Coal Company case
said that, "Undoubtedly at common law, an unincorporated association
of persons was not recognized as having any other character than a
partnership in whatever was done, and it could only sue or be sued in
the names of its members, and their liability had to be enforced against
IRentschler v. Missouri Pacific Ry., (Neb. 1934) 253 N.W. 696.
2 "The labor contract, therefore, is not a contract, it is a continuing implied
renewal of contracts at every minute and hour, based on the continuance of
what is deemed on the employer's side, to be satisfactory service, and, on the
laborer's side, what is deemed to be satisfactory conditions and compensation."
John R. Commons, "Legal Foundations of Capitalism," p. 285 (1924).
3 This discussion is concerned with the employment of the more ordinary labor
and not with those instances where the services to be rendered are of a special
nature, such as singers, artists, etc., who have a unique value.
444 Harv. Law Rev. 572 (1930) "Collective Labor Agreements in American
Law," William Gorham Rice, Jr.
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each member." 5 Certainly the common law did not recognize an association as an entity which could carry on its own business as such.
Many of the cases state that such an association may not be a party
plaintiff or defendant in the absence of a statute permitting it.6
Because these associations have become an important factor in the
social structure and do in fact act as entities, making contracts, holding property and incurring obligations, the growing tendency is one of
recognition.7 As early as 1896 Thomas Holland pointed out that in
England the distinction between the status of the corporation and that
of the unincorporated association was being broken down., Wisconsin
has obliterated this distinction and allows the trade union to appear as
a party.9 This healthy attitude has become settled doctrine in most of
the more advanced industrial jurisdictions where the problem is more
frequently presented.
Most cases involving trade unions are brought in the equity court.
Equity procedure allows one person to bring a suit as a representative
of many other persons too numerous to sue or be sued. A very common
practice is to have the action brought by the officers for the benefit of
the whole membership of the union. This avoids the necessity of de-

5 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344,66 L.Ed. 975 (1922).
6 West v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry., 103 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654 (1927) represents the traditional view.
Wisconsin has several statutes which may be interpreted to mean that the
entity of an unincorporated trade union would be recognized even if the cases
did not make this apparent.
Sec. 133.07 (1) (Wis. Stats., 1933) provides that working people may organize into unions for mutual benefit, protection of their rights and regulation
of their wages and hours.
Sec. 133.08 (Wis. Stats. 1933) expressly exempts trade unions from the
operation of the anti-trust laws.
A reasonable inference could be drawn that since collective bargains made
by trade unions are expressly recognized and permitted by the statutes, the
courts would recognize the associations which. made the agreement as a proper party plaintiff or defendant in any litigation concerning it.
7 "It is an undoubted fact that clubs, trade union, churches and other social
organizations are frequently created without formality of incorporation. Such
groups do exist as facts, and their members customarily think of them as
units. It is not apparent that anything substantial will be gained by the community if the courts insist on closing their eyes to these facts, which everyone
else clearly recognizes." 43 Harv. Law Rev. 1009 (1930) "The Internal Affairs
of Associations not for Profit," Zechariah Chafee.
8 "Elements of Jurisprudence" p. 289 (*302) note 16 (1896) Thomas Holland.
See also 42 Harv. Law Rev. 977 at 995, "Dogma and Practice in the Law of
Associations." E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., for further comment on this tendency.
9
Adler and Sons v. Maglio, 200 Wis. 153, 228 N.W. 123 (1929). Here Maglio
as an officer of the union and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
were joined as defendants. Joining the union as a party defendant was not
even questioned.
New Jersey allows the union to be sued; service upon the business agent
of the union being considered sufficient. Unkovich et al v. N. Y. Central Ry.
Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 448, 168 Atl. 867 (1933).
Contra: West v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co., supra, note 6. No action
could be maintained against the local lodge of the union (unincorporated)
because no valid judgment could be taken against it. Note the comparatively
recent date.
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ciding whether or not the union as such has the ability to sue or be
sued.' 0 In a code state the same procedure may be followed where the
action is at law." In almost any jurisdiction, then, the union may be,
in fact if not in appearance, a party to an action on a collective agreement.
CONSIDERATION

The objection that collective bargaining contracts lack consideration
was formerly a stronger argument than it is today. Modern courts have
found several ways around it."

Some have looked at the situation

realistically and have recognized that while a person cannot be forced
to work against his will, economic compulsion forces most men to
work; that there is no need for legal compulsion. Therefore, they have
not held that the contract lacked consideration simply because the
union could not promise that all of its members would work for any
specified length of time. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court found
sufficient consideration in a laborer's willingness to work. 13 This willingness was not stated or implied in the agreement but the court implied it from the situation and the acts of the parties. Other courts have
looked to the agreement itself and have found something they could
call consideration. A promise by the union to call no strikes during the4
period the agreement was to run was considered good consideration.'
The manufacturer's privilege to use the union label was considered
good consideration. 5 A fixed wage scale which could be counted upon
over a period of time was also considered sufficient.' 6 In a great many
of the cases the question of consideration is neither raised no discussed; it is presumed. The fact that the agreement may have been
brought about by the use bf economic force (strikes, etc.) does not
usually operate to suspend the presumption that the employer must
have had some benefit from the contract if he was willing to enter into
it.
'0 "Equity procedure adapting itself to modern needs has grown to recognize the
need of representation by one person of many, too numerous to sue or be
sued * * * out of the very necessities of the existing conditions and the utter
impossibility of doing justice otherwise, the suable character of such an organization as this has come to be recognized in some jurisdiction*** " United
Mine Worker v. Coronado Coal Co., supra, note 5.
" Sec. 260.12, Wis. Stats., (1933).
"2 Hudson v. Cincinnati,N. 0. and T. P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47, 45
L.R.A. (N.S.) 184, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 98 (1913). The court here stated that
the lack of any agreement on the part of the men to work any specific length
of time was sufficiently serious to prevent the agreement from being an enforceable contract because there is no consideration. The court felt that because no individual could be forced to work the agreement could be terminated
at the will of either party.
However, in a recent decision the Iowa Supreme Court required a consideration expressed in the contract and refused to imply one from the facts.
Wilson et al v. Airline Co., (Iowa 1933) 246 N.W. 753.
"1
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W. (2nd.) 692 (1928).
4
' Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1922).
"5
Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 925 (1924).
' 6 Meltzer et at. v. Kaminer, 131 Misc. Rep. 813, 227 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1927).
In this case the employers had relied upon the wage scale to enter into contracts.

NOTES
MUTUALITY

Specific performance of collective bargaining agreements was sometimes denied to the union because there was a lack of mutuality; specific performance could not have been given to the employer. Enforcing the agreement against the union was regarded as decreeing performance of personal services, which equity ordinarily will not do. An
early New York case pointed out that such a decree against an employer would be given only where the services contracted for were
unique, for equity would enforce a contract for unique personal
services."
Later cases, however, gave relief to the union because the employers are conversely entitled to equitable relief. Certainly there is no
dearth of cases in which a union was prevented from breaching its
agreement not to strike, or to ask for higher wages and so on.:" While
such a decree is usually in the form of an injunction, practically its
effect is that of a decree of specific performance. The courts apply this
theory, feeling that there should not be one law for employer and another for employee. The New York court in the well-known case of
Schlesinger v. Quinto said that to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement against a union would not be enforcing a contract for personal services at all; that the contract was made between two large associations, not between two individuals (Schlesinger was the president
of the International Ladies' Garment Workers union and Quinto was
an officer of the Cloak, Suit and Skirt Manufacturers' Protective Association) ; that each of these associations had the power to enter into
contracts for its members; and that each association had the power
to enforce its laws and compel its members to obey the decree.Y9 This
would remove from the court the burden of supervision which is the
reason for refusing to give decrees which entailed personal services.
It is, of course, especially true where the industry is fairly completely
organized as in the case of the Garment Workers union and the Musician's union.20 In fully organized industries a union card is usually a
prerequisite to employment and the union has the power to take away
Stone Cleaning & Pointing Union v. Russell, 38 Misc. Rep. 513, 77 N.Y. Supp.
1049 (1902). The union was trying to enforce a closed shop agreement and
the court denied a decree of specific performance because the work done by
the union members was not considered unique.
is Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N.Y. Supp. 279
(1916). A strike was enjoined as a violation of a collective bargain. See also,
Blin & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N.E. 154 (1926).
19 Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra, note 14. This action was brought by the union
to prevent the employer's association from breaking an agreement. It is one
of the earliest cases on record where a union got an injunction against an
employer. See also Ribner v. Racso Co., 135 Misc. Rep. 813, 227 N.Y. Supp. 132
(1927). Here the union is given equitable relief because the employer could
have had it had the situation been reversed.
20 Weber et al v. Nasser et aL., (Cal. 1930) 286 Pac. 1074. The owners of certain
theaters had entered into a contract with the Musicians' Union to hire a certain number of musicians during the period. The defendant owners then installed talking devices and refused to hire the musicians. The action was
brought to force the defendants to continue to hire them. The defendants contended that they could not have forced the musicians to play and therefore
there was no mutuality. The California court stated the same theory as that
expressed in the Schlesinger case (note 19) that the contract was between
associations, not individuals.
n
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this card for disobedience of the rules. The coercive power of a union
over its members may, then, be very great.
Though it is never expressly stated by the court, underlying this
reasoning must be a realization that there is no need of legal compulsion to make the members work; that the court will not be called on
to make a decree forcing men to work. (This has been especially true
since the war when even during the years of prosperity the demand for
employment has been increasingly greater than the supply of it, because
of technological improvements and other economic factors.) Any other
order which the court might have to make against the union, such as
an order not to call a strike or to stop picketing a certain factory, could
not be considered a decree for personal services and would be enforceable.
In giving legal effect to these agreements the courts have been
moved by considerations of public policy. It has been recognized that
if these agreements are not enforced by the court the unions will attempt to enforce them themselves by strikes which are injurious to
the persons immediately concerned and to the public as well. In the
words of the Supreme Court of California, "Courts should, in the interest of public welfare, give recognition to the laudable efforts of
groups to improve industrial conditions and prevent waste and violence, and where the parties have contracted with that end in view,
their contracts
should be enforced in a manner to give them effect, if
21
possible."1

EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES AT LAW

An action upon a collective bargaining agreement may be brought
by the union for the benefit of all of its members, or it may be brought
by an individual for his own benefit. It may be brought at law for damages caused by the breach of the agreement or it may be brought in
equity to present a further breach. When the action is brought by the
union it is almost without exception in equity; damages at law would
be inadequate and difficult to assess.22 Furthermore, the union is necessarily not so interested in being repaid for the injury already done as it
is in preventing violations in the future. This is usually recognized by
the courts. If equitable relief is denied it is seldom because the remedy
at law is adequate. 23 Occasionally liquidated damages are provided for
in the contract. Where such provision has been made and 24
the covenant
breached, the union will, of course, bring the action at law.
Where the action is brought by an individual member of the union
21 Weber et al. v. Nasser et al., at p. 1077, supra, note 20.
22
Ribner v. Racso Co., 135 Misc. Rep. 813, 227 N.Y. Supp. 132 (1927) explains
that the remedy at law is inadequate because there is an irreparable and con-

tinuous injury to the moral and prestige of the union which could not be aided
by money damages. See also Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra, note 14.
23 But see Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell, supra, note 17 at page
1050 where it is stated, "Plaintiff, if it has any cause of action, will have an
adequate remedy at law, just as would any other employee wrongfully discharged. It will be possible for it to show the amount of services of the kind
specified in the contract rendered to the defendant by others than its (the
union's) members, which its members might have rendered, and the consequent damage if any." It would be difficult to assess damages according to this
24 formula.
Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 76 N.E. 5 (1905).
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it is ordinarily an action at law for damages or loss of wages caused
by the breach. This is not because the individual cannot bring an action
for specific performance of the contract but because he is more interested in getting damages for the injury done to him. Because the member has had no part in the making of the agreement there has been
some difficulty in deciding exactly how individual rights have been acquired under it. The cases may be divided roughly into four classes:
where the individual is regarded as a third party beneficiary of the
contract made by the employer and the union; where the union is regarded as an agent for the individual in making the contract so that
the contract is in fact the individual contract of the union member; and
where the agreement is considered a set of rules and usages which are
the basis for the individual employment contract, in other words, the
individual contracts with reference to them. Then there are some cases
which just assume that the rights of the individual
are in some un25
specified way fixed by the collective agrement.
Few cases follow the theory that the contract is made by the union
and the employer for the benefit of the member of the union as a third
party beneficiary. One reason for this may be that the doctrine of third
party beneficiary contracts is not favored in some jurisdictions. Where
the theory is relied on it is held that the validity of the collective agreement is not affected by any subsequent agreement made between the
employer and the individual employee. The two agreements may be in
conflict. In Gulla v. Barton26 the collective agreement provided for a
wage of $18 a week. The plaintiff workman, although a member of the
union, did not know of this and contracted to work for defendant for
$9 a week. He sued to recover the difference for the period during
which he had worked, and recovered. (This was a union shop.) The
court stated that2 the
two agreements were concurrent and did not de7
stroy each other.

Where the agency theory is applied the court are much concerned
with the problem of whether or not the individual member has ratified
the agreement made by the union as his agent. No rights can accrue
to him which can be enforced against the employer unless there has
been a ratification. Just what ratification consists of is hard to determine. It has been said that a mere entering into employment with
knowledge of the collective agreement and assent to the rules laid
down is not an agreement by the individual to make it his own contract. 28 It is difficult to see what more could be done. In Burnetta v.
Marceline Coal Co. it was stated that a mere statement that the member understood the rules laid down in the collective agreement was not
sufficient.2 9 Apparently there must be some express intent to work under the rules. This is a weakness in the theory for as a practical matter
there will seldom be any expressed intent to work under the rules. It is
usually assumed by members of a union, working in a unionized shop
that they will work under union rules and would make no remark con25 Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 37 Ga. App. 744, 141 S.E. 819 (1928).
26 Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N.Y. Supp. 925 (1924). There is some
hint that the court has looked at the agreement in the Schlesinger case, supra,
27
28

note 14, in this way but no very definite statement is made. See also Hall v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S.W. (2d.) 687 (1930).
West v. B. and 0. R. Co., supra, note 6.
Hudson v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., supra, note 12.
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cerning it whatever. It is a formalistic requirement which could well be
dispensed with. The ratification could be implied from the acts of the
parties. A separate agreement by the individual to work for other
hours or wages than those provided in the collective agreement would,
of course, be evidence of no ratification and under this theory such an
individual could not share in the benefits of the collective agreement
too, as he could under the third party beneficiary theory.
The third theory is the usage theory. It holds that the collective
agreement is no agreement at all; it merely sets up rules and regulations which are the usage or custom of the trade. All individual contracts are made with reference to this, and the rules and provisions are
incorporated into the individual employment contract. 30 Nothing need
be said about the collective agreement at all if it is known to both
parties. It will be assumed that the employment contract is governed
by these rules, and the parties' rights are fixed by them. 31 However,
this usage must be known to the parties making the employment agreement in order to make it with reference to this usage.3 2 The usage may
be stretched to affect the contracts made even by non-members of the
union who do the same type of work done by union members.3 3 This
theory is applied more often than any of the others in dealing with
individual rights, probably because of the greater possibilities of a liberal treatment of collective bargaining agreements under it. It does not
have the formalistic drawback of the agency theory and it may be
used in those jurisdictions where the contract for the benefit of a third
party would not be enforced in favor of the third party.
The same court then, may look at the agreement as a contract
which is binding between the union and the employer but as a mere
memorandum of a usage between an individual member of the union
and the employer, in respect to which a binding agreement may be
made. It is then, a contract and not a contract, depending upon the
parties. The collective bargaining agreement is a comparatively new
problem to the law and has not yet been fully defined. It does not fit
well into any of the fixed legal categories in all of its aspects and may
well require special treatment which is not bounded by the limitations
of the law of contracts.
CAROLYN E.
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29 Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136 (1904); Piercy v.

Louisville and N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923), points out that
the agency of the union is limited to the purpose of securing fair and just
wages and good working conditions and it may not waive the rights of indi-

viduals.

Ahlquist v. Alaska-Portland Packers' Ass'n., 39 F. (2d) 348 (C.C.A. 9th.

1930) holds that if the union agent is actually authorized to do what has been

done, no ratification is necessary. This is unusual.
30 "* * * the legal effect of the agreement between the operators and miners is

that it became a part of and formed the basis of employment between each
operator accepting it and each of his employees, who entered or continued in
the services and employment of such employer with knowledge of its execution, and in the absence of any express contract between the individual em-

ployee and his employer inconsistent with the terms of the agreement." Cross
Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W. (2d.) 692 (1928) at 694.

31 United States Daily Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 32 F. (2nd) 834 (App. D.C.
32 1929).
33

Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific Ry., supra, note 1.
Yazoo and M. V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931) ; Gregg
v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920).

